[Winstonm]

luke warm, on 2011-February-08, 16:42, said:

but is hume right that a violation of the laws of nature is required? there are people, not all of whom are theists, who would would disagree with this

How fitting we should come full circle back to definitions. Imprecise definitions have kept this debate going for centuries.

[barmar]

luke warm, on 2011-February-08, 14:11, said:

me too... but, as richard says, "freakisly improbable" is not the same as impossible... do you personally agree with this?

That's true, but as PassedOut describes, the more improbable the claim, the more convincing the evidence for it needs to be.

Someone above tried to invoke quantum mechanics to suggest the possibility of teleportation and resurrection. While it's theoretically possible, the probability is so infinitessimal that it can be ignored. The probability that a single atom will teleport at any particular time is freakishly small. Then multiply this by itself for the enormous number of atoms in a body. And then it gets even smaller when you require them all to teleport in the same direction and distance, so that the body as a whole is reproduced at the new location. The chance that this would happen once in the entire age of the universe is negligible.

It's also theoretically possible for the same person to win the lottery every day in a row for a year. "Theoretically possible" is not the same as "might actually happen".

[phil_20686]

While Hume is right in essence, his argument can still be easily rebutted, in that assigning some probability to something is inherently based on your "priors". Humes attempt to evaluate all pieces of evidence by personal experience, if taken literally, is pretty absurd. It seems clear that he would include, for example, knowledge learned from books and so on. In that case, he is really evaluating the degree of believe based on a set of assumptions. It is only by the assumption that there is no supernatural occurrences that you arrive at the conclusion that a miracle is improbable. If you, from personal experience say, beleive in God, then you would not regard the statement "there are at least some miracles" as inherently improbable. While that does not prevent one taking a given claim with a pinch of salt, it does rather undermine the spirit of his argument.

[phil_20686]

barmar, on 2011-February-09, 03:13, said:

That's true, but as PassedOut describes, the more improbable the claim, the more convincing the evidence for it needs to be.

Perhaps I could have stated my previous post better. Hume is claiming that the prior probability for a miracle is low, because he has never seen one, and because they conflict with his assumptions about how the world works. A quick reflection on the existence of, say, a gorilla, will tell you that he is really leaning heavily on the second part of this statement. However, we now have a rather nice demonstration of Bayesian prior. Hume basically argues that if you assume that miracles are impossible, then it is always more likely that your observer was deceived in some way. However, if your priors were, say, 50% god exists and can do miracles, and 50% God does not exist, then, since in the first case the probability of a miracle existing is one, it does not take much evidence to conclude that the probability of God existing is higher than him not existing. Indeed, you are stuck in the unfortunate position that if you determine that it is 99% likely he is lying and 1% you still have evidence for God's existence, since God's existence doesn't change the chances that you could be deceived.

[luke warm]

phil_20686, on 2011-February-08, 18:11, said:

It really wasn't my intention to get into theology about different Christian positions, but hrothgar did say I had a responsibility to correct erroneous beliefs of my fellow Christians

i appreciate all the help i can get... tell me, in your theology is keeping the Law (capitalized to differentiate it in your mind from 'law' - although i still maintain it is a whole) necessary for salvation?

[PassedOut]

phil_20686, on 2011-February-08, 11:46, said:

Sure, Theism and Atheism on their own do not define a philosophy of life, I but everyone should endeavour to have a philosophy of life of which their theistic position is a part. This should explain as much of the world as possible without a preponderance of random caveats. When you talk about discovering something, you imply that they have an existence separate from the one who discovers them. This is really quite a mysterious position for an atheist. After-all, what underpins the existence of something that seems to have no basis in our material universe? Of course, no such problem arises for the theist as he simply says that God is Divine Reason, and necessarily is expected to created something governed by Reason.

Of course you appreciate that, from my perspective, whenever someone answers a question with, "God did that," the answer is bound to be unreliable, even obstructive.

Regarding the creation of laws that describe physical behavior, it is simpler to accept that all possible sets of such laws, being non-material, exist independently of any physical universe. Given any specific physical universe, it becomes the challenge of the intelligent beings (if any) that develop in that universe to determine which specific set of laws applies in their own universe.

For my part, I don't find it at all unsatisfying that mankind's quest to accomplish that is far from finished. Rather, I see that quest as exhilarating, even heroic.

test

[Winstonm]

The problem with the hypothesis "God did it" is that it requires a theory to explain how God did it. This is problematic, as God (an abstract concept) cannot be reified by whim into a physical mediator that can interact with matter. If I want the pencil lying on the table to move, another physical object has to come into physical contact with it - my finger, blown air molecules, etc. If we simply claim God's will can be a cause, without explaining a physical mediator, then we are simply positing magic. That is not an explanation.

All words are concepts, and some of these word-concepts can be resolved to physical objects that we can point to and have named: tree, rock, table, etc., and some words cannot be resolved to physical objects, energy, gravity, logic, etc.

The problem with our common discourse is that we have become used to the idea of allowing these abstract concepts to be used as nouns, reifying them into physical objects and by doing so imbuing them with magical powers. We say things like, the dam will produce enough energy to yada, yada, yadi, enough energy to cool our houses...

But how can we produce something that exists only in our minds as an abstract concept? Do we smear some energy on our skin to cool off? Energy is not a "thing" but a descriptor. We define energy as the ability to do work. We cannot go to the store and buy a pound, a bunch, or a gallon of "the ability to do work".

It is this broad acceptability of reifying abstract concepts into nouns that allows the claims of "God did it" to persist. Saying "God did it" is not a lot different than saying "energy did it", which helps explain why no one wants to use an unambiguous and precise definition of the word "exist". If we define "exist" as a physical presence, that which has shape and location, then energy, gravity, mass, and a host of other abstract descriptive ideas are placed into the category of "explainatory abstract concepts" and taken out of the "real physical presence" category.

IMO, this is their correct category, as these descriptive ideas are actions that occur, but they are not things that "are", and thus the thinking that produces the ideas certainly occurs within reality, but real things - i.e., nouns - expressed as an abstract idea do not exist.

[Winstonm]

phil_20686, on 2011-February-09, 05:57, said:

While Hume is right in essence, his argument can still be easily rebutted, in that assigning some probability to something is inherently based on your "priors". Humes attempt to evaluate all pieces of evidence by personal experience, if taken literally, is pretty absurd. It seems clear that he would include, for example, knowledge learned from books and so on. In that case, he is really evaluating the degree of believe based on a set of assumptions. It is only by the assumption that there is no supernatural occurrences that you arrive at the conclusion that a miracle is improbable. If you, from personal experience say, beleive in God, then you would not regard the statement "there are at least some miracles" as inherently improbable. While that does not prevent one taking a given claim with a pinch of salt, it does rather undermine the spirit of his argument.

Phil,

While I agree that the preponderence of our knowledge comes from authority, i.e. is learned without firsthand experience, there is still a distinct difference between verifiable (to a degree) knowledge and non-verifiable knowledge, and this is what I think Hume was alluding to.

We can reproduce a scientific experiment - we can climb on the top of the house and drop off two objects with different weights to see if they do indeed hit the ground at the same time.

We are hard pressed to repeat the water-into-wine experiment.

In these cases, I would have to value the first case as much higher order of knowledge than the second case.

I have knowledge of the book Frankenstein, but that does not make me believe dead flesh can be reanimated and live. I make a value judgement that the book was fictional. I make the same value judgement that the bible is a written compilation of morality myths, oral legends, and oral traditions, with a similar value to Homer's works.

[phil_20686]

luke warm, on 2011-February-09, 06:09, said:

i appreciate all the help i can get... tell me, in your theology is keeping the Law (capitalized to differentiate it in your mind from 'law' - although i still maintain it is a whole) necessary for salvation?

Ah, you *must* be an evangelical now .

I am not 100% sure that your question makes sense from a Catholic perspective. I think to answer it fully I would need to write an essay, so instead I will offer a few short comments, that together hopefully add up to at least half an answer.

(1) The Divine Law is precisely an expression of God's Love. It is uncontroversial in Christianity to say that the Law is based entirely on those actions which further Divine Love. See Mt 22:37. In a sense, then keeping the Divine Law is simply to Love God and one another, and do only those actions in keeping with that. Thus we have come in essence to the question of whether faith and works are necessary to salvation, or only faith.

(2) I am sure that we can agree that repentance is a necessary part of salvation, and repentance would be impossible without some conception of the Law.

(3) I will describe here a catholic interpretation of how salvation proceeds according to the council of Trent:
God freely gives Grace enabling a man to choose to turn away from his sin.
Man retains his free will, and rather that overrule free will, grace rather perfects it by granting men strength enough to refuse further sins.
Following this, man must co-operate in his justification. He is at any time free to return to a state of sin. Justification proceeds precisely by continuing to choose what is Holy over what is not.
If a man should fall from this path of justification, he may again choose to repent and start again.
Thus, one might say, that if you fail to keep the Law you endanger your salvation, and must repent again. Of course, strictly, it is faith and repentance that return you to a state of Grace, but keeping the Law still has an important Role to play in this sequence.

Finally, returning to point (1), on the question of faith and works, this has been the major point of contention between Catholics and Protestants for centuries.
Doubtless you will quote Paul from Romans and Galatians. I will quote The letter of James, and Revelation. (James writes"faith without works is dead....and thus we see that salvation proceeds from both faith and works", revelations "And Hades will give up its dead, and each shall be judged according to their deeds, as they are recorded in the book of life"). It is one aspect of of Protestant theology where I have never really been able to see where they are coming from tbh. It seems to me that even in the beatitudes, and as a general rule, Jesus infers that your actions in this life will reflect your judgement in the next life. He warns against all kinds of behaviour that will lead to damnation. Even while Paul goes onto develop justification through faith, he still writes early on that "For it is not those who hear the law who are righteous in God’s sight, but it is those who obey the law who will be declared righteous." (Romans 2).

I suppose, then that the short answer is basically yes, I think that it is necessary to (attempt to) obey the Law, but I do not think that failing necessarily condemns you, provided you have repentance.

[phil_20686]

Winstonm, on 2011-February-09, 09:24, said:

The problem with the hypothesis "God did it" is that it requires a theory to explain how God did it. This is problematic, as God (an abstract concept) cannot be reified by whim into a physical mediator that can interact with matter. If I want the pencil lying on the table to move, another physical object has to come into physical contact with it - my finger, blown air molecules, etc. If we simply claim God's will can be a cause, without explaining a physical mediator, then we are simply positing magic. That is not an explanation.

All words are concepts, and some of these word-concepts can be resolved to physical objects that we can point to and have named: tree, rock, table, etc., and some words cannot be resolved to physical objects, energy, gravity, logic, etc.

The problem with our common discourse is that we have become used to the idea of allowing these abstract concepts to be used as nouns, reifying them into physical objects and by doing so imbuing them with magical powers. We say things like, the dam will produce enough energy to yada, yada, yadi, enough energy to cool our houses...

But how can we produce something that exists only in our minds as an abstract concept? Do we smear some energy on our skin to cool off? Energy is not a "thing" but a descriptor. We define energy as the ability to do work. We cannot go to the store and buy a pound, a bunch, or a gallon of "the ability to do work".

It is this broad acceptability of reifying abstract concepts into nouns that allows the claims of "God did it" to persist. Saying "God did it" is not a lot different than saying "energy did it", which helps explain why no one wants to use an unambiguous and precise definition of the word "exist". If we define "exist" as a physical presence, that which has shape and location, then energy, gravity, mass, and a host of other abstract descriptive ideas are placed into the category of "explainatory abstract concepts" and taken out of the "real physical presence" category.

IMO, this is their correct category, as these descriptive ideas are actions that occur, but they are not things that "are", and thus the thinking that produces the ideas certainly occurs within reality, but real things - i.e., nouns - expressed as an abstract idea do not exist.

This entire post seems to amount to "if God is not real, you should not refer to him as a real thing". True, but not very helpful. Further, the concept that abstract ideas do not have an existence separate from the one conceiving them, is itself a disputed topic in Philosophy. This goes back at least two millennia and started with the question of whether platonic solids can be said to exist, even if they are not realisable in nature.

Its true that language is often used casually in these cases where we say "gravity causes X", and we mean "Our theory of gravity describes the physical process that is causing X". Nevertheless, this does not alter the basic thesis of your Post, which is that God is not real. Also, I think that to say that something non physical does not exist by assumption is to shrink the world. After all, by this definition, the Past cannot properly be said to exist. It seems to me that you are simply excluding things from consideration on the grounds that we cannot necessarily agree about what words to use for them. GK Chesteron spotted the flaw in this kind of reasoning: A small circle is quite as infinite as a large circle, just not as big.

[phil_20686]

Winstonm, on 2011-February-09, 09:43, said:

While I agree that the preponderence of our knowledge comes from authority, i.e. is learned without firsthand experience, there is still a distinct difference between verifiable (to a degree) knowledge and non-verifiable knowledge, and this is what I think Hume was alluding to.

We can reproduce a scientific experiment - we can climb on the top of the house and drop off two objects with different weights to see if they do indeed hit the ground at the same time.

We are hard pressed to repeat the water-into-wine experiment.

In these cases, I would have to value the first case as much higher order of knowledge than the second case.

Karl Popper's take on science seems a bit dated now. There are whole reams of scientific thought that are not based on repeatable experiments. Notably, Evolutionary biology and Cosmology. Now sure, we can still take measurements in some sense. But we certainly cannot run the whole thing over again to check our calculations! Oh for the simplicity of Condensed Matter Physicists.

Nevertheless, you are again guilty of shrinking the world. You have excluded from this every other kind of knowledge that is not repeatable, like Historical Knowledge. There is even such a thing as Historical Scientific knowledge: experiments that cannot be repeated, eg, measuring the strength of a volcanic eruption, or the temperature records which show Global Warming. I think philosophy of science puts too much emphasis on repeatability.

Anyway, I think you are wrong to define these as different kinds of knowledge, its just about how much trust you put in a given claim. Hume's point is that since I am virtually certain miracles don't happen, but I do know that people are often mistaken about what they see, I am not required to consider evidence of a miracle as evidence of anything. However, he was a empiricist/positivist, who really strongly believed that only things you had measured could be considered real in any definitive sense. Thus he argued that your prior should be to assume that miracles (violations of the natural law) are contrary to experience and hence you should assume them impossible, having made such an assumption, you would need testimony on a large scale to convince you. Still, this is really only a form of assuming the answer (begging the question) which prevents a fair assessment of miraculous claims as evidence for theistic belief.

[Winstonm]

I am always perplexed when a religious discussion turns to theology and biblical quotes are then used to validate points.

Has anyone read Bart Ehrman's NYT bestsellers "Misquoting Jesus" and "Jesus Interrupted"?

The conflict to which Phil alludes between Jewish Law adherence and no adherence only came about as far as can be determined by the opinions of Paul. According to Dr. Erhman, no actual teaching from Jesus himself contradicted Jewish Law, and that there is (my paraphrase here) a theological evolutionary pattern of change that was implemented by succeeding men who wrote their understanding of the oral traditions of their times and places, going from oldest gospel, Mark, to latest, John.

As Ehrman points out, the book of Mark is apocraphyl, teaching the Jewish understanding to Jews of a messiah who would return to earth within the lives of the then living generation to resolve forever the dichotomy of good/evil and establish an earthly kingdom.

65-years later, when it became obvious that the messiah wasn't coming as promised, a new idea of a divine (meaning having been with god all along) Jesus (as the word in John) who promised a future heavenly reward, not an earthly kingdom, was introduced.

Even the idea of when and how Jesus became the son of god changed with each version, with retellings. From an adopted son in Mark who became the son by baptism of John the Baptist, to son by means of virgin birth and direct interaction of god/man in Matthew and Luke, to John's Jesus divinity who was there at creation and who was both with god and also was god, in the beggining was the word, etc.

Sorry to interrupt, but I wanted to plug these Ehrman books because they discuss issues that are simply not taught anywhere else but seminaries, and most laymen, like myself, have lttle-to-no inkling of how fallible and humanly inspired is the inerrant word of god without someone like Ehrman to point it out.

[Winstonm]

Quote

you are simply excluding things from consideration on the grounds that we cannot necessarily agree about what words to use for them.

Not quite. What I am doing is removing subjective opinion and expressing the perspective of nature. Nature is binary, and operates only in present time. It is always now to nature - memory is required to undertand the concept of motion measured - i.e., time. So how can time exist as a reified natural object as Einstein suggested when it is simply an abstraction of the idea of measuring cumulative ticks in relation to two positions? To nature, the moon is always here. Nature does not remember that two hours ago as measured by these humanly-made ticks the moon was over there, so it has moved. Time requires memory as a comparative device.

Quote

Anyway, I think you are wrong to define these as different kinds of knowledge, its just about how much trust you put in a given claim

Yes, knowledge is nothing more than trust that a claim is valid. But what I am saying is that as reasoning humans, we have an obligation to separate real from the imagined, regardless of opinion.

All I am doing by using precise and unambiguous definitions is creating separation between the view from Mother Nature's perspective and human sentient perpective. From Mother Nature's perspective something either is or it isn't - a binary system. She doesn't take notice of human knowledge, tests, beliefs, hopes, dreams, abstract concepts, trust, or proofs.

I am not limiting reality but instead subdividing it into nature's reality and man's concept of real-occuring events. Nature does not recognize energy as a "thing". Man finds the abstract concept useful in design and engineering.
However, is it not rational to talk about both categories as if both were the same "thing". It is the act of reifying - making abstract concepts a reality - that is the culprit. It is this reification process that allows the impossible to exist.

It is better to consider two separate types of reality - one real and the other imagined real - and the latter cannot become the former, but the former may be expressed in the latter.

Why is this important? Nature "knew" that the moons of Jupiter orbited that planet before Galileo pointed his telescope at Jupiter and mankind found knowledge.
In the same way as those moons, to nature god either exists or does not exist.

To have any intelligent discourse about god that can lead to a resolution, we have to use reality rather than imagined reality. Why? Because only nature's reality offers the binary yes/no dichotomy that can be resolved.

If we use imagined reality as our frame of reference, all we end up doing is debating what ifs.

You may not like the method or the conclusion of such a harsh interpretation, but that would be your opinion. The object of the presented method is to eliminate opinion in favor of finding resolutions.

[kenberg]

I prefer this to philosophy.

[Winstonm]

And then there is Schrodinger's Deck: Until you take the losing finesse, the Queen does not exist.

[vuroth]

hrothgar, on 2011-February-04, 09:05, said:

However, at the same time we're degrading our ability to falsify the theory which conflicts with the goal of falsification.

Oh, I don't know, I'd love to have a theory handy that was completely impossible to falsify. Ok, it might not be exactly correct, I guess, but it would be tremendously useful.

hotShot, on 2011-February-05, 15:03, said:

Didn't it take the Council of Chalcedon (http://en.wikipedia....il_of_Chalcedon) 451 to get the existing Christian churches to reach some fundamental consent, about the nature of Jesus, building the base of the separation of the East European church at the same time?

I believe that was when the Coptics split from the european orthodoxies, so even that date does not work.

Phil_20686 said:

However, none of that is my principle objection. The real problem lies in the fact that it is really not very far from "No child must learn creationism because its wrong" to "Every child must learn that communism is the ideal form of government". Ultimately, the authority to decide what children learn must reside somewhere, and I would argue vehemently that the appropriate repository for that authority is the Parents. Indeed, it cannot be the State, which derives its authority only from the consent of the People it governs. The only question is whether people who do not have children of their own should have a say in what children learn, and I think the answer to this is probably no.

You're being awfully disingenious. I mean, if the only place anyone is allowed to teach anything is school, then sure, I'm right with you, but of course that's nonsense.

I would hazard a guess that every skeptic and atheist in the country would be happy to have every child in America learn creationism, except possibly their own children. The vocal and constant objection to teaching creationism in schools isn't so much that people are taught it, but that it is taught as being as accepted, as proven, and as likely as evolution.

It's not a matter of taking a head count of voters, and it's not a matter of how popular a belief is. Teaching evolution in some manner in schools is acceptable because of the body of evidence behind it. Teaching creationism, or pastafarianism, in schools is not.

That does not mean that these subjects can not be taught, just that it should be done somewhere OTHER than the taxpayer's bill.

[luke warm]

phil_20686, on 2011-February-09, 11:06, said:

Ah, you *must* be an evangelical now .

i'm protestant, though the two might be synonymous to some people

Quote

I am sure that we can agree that repentance is a necessary part of salvation, and repentance would be impossible without some conception of the Law.

actually my view is that repentance follows salvation

Quote

Finally, returning to point (1), on the question of faith and works, this has been the major point of contention between Catholics and Protestants for centuries.

can't argue with that

Quote

Doubtless you will quote Paul from Romans and Galatians. I will quote The letter of James, and Revelation.

two books luther wanted excluded from the canon... the revelation because of its apocryphal nature (he thought it more like isiah or ezekial) and james because ... well, because he was james - a man whose teachings paul called anathema, a man who sent others to undermine paul's teachings ... james is the one, after all, who taught that circumcision (little 'l' law?) was necessary for salvation...

Quote

It [salvation by grace alone through faith alone, i suppose] is one aspect of of Protestant theology where I have never really been able to see where they are coming from tbh.

it's not too difficult to understand... if any human act at all was required, why the death and resurrection? why not just a severe beating, or tongue lashing? the protestant view is that man can do nothing to earn salvation, nor does he deserve it... if works of any kind enter into it, then to just that degree salvation is earned (or deserved)

Quote

I suppose, then that the short answer is basically yes, I think that it is necessary to (attempt to) obey the Law, but I do not think that failing necessarily condemns you, provided you have repentance.

this is simply a theological disagreement, and i honestly don't want to get into a long exchange over it (as you wrote, it's all been said before, anyway)... thanks for your time

[Winstonm]

Quote

two books luther wanted excluded from the canon... the revelation because of its apocryphal nature (he thought it more like isiah or ezekial) and james because ... well, because he was james

Luther? Martin Luther? This Martin Luther?

Quote

Accordingly, it must and dare not be considered a trifling matter but a most serious one to seek counsel against this and to save our souls from the Jews, that is, from the devil and from eternal death. My advice, as I said earlier, is:

First, that their synagogues be burned down...it would be good if someone could also throw in some hellfire...

Second, that all their books...be taken from them

Third, that they be forbidden on pain of death to praise God, to give thanks, to pray, and to teach publicly among us and in our country...

Fourth, that they be forbidden to utter the name of God within our hearing. For we cannot with a good conscience listen to this or tolerate it...

-Martin Luther On the Jews and Their Lies 1543

Hmmmm. Curious judgement values to rely upon for theological decisions.

[barmar]

phil_20686, on 2011-February-09, 11:38, said:

Nevertheless, you are again guilty of shrinking the world. You have excluded from this every other kind of knowledge that is not repeatable, like Historical Knowledge. There is even such a thing as Historical Scientific knowledge: experiments that cannot be repeated, eg, measuring the strength of a volcanic eruption, or the temperature records which show Global Warming. I think philosophy of science puts too much emphasis on repeatability.

Historical science is repeatable. Not in the manner of performing an experiment and seeing the results, but by making predictions about future historical finds. For instance, every time we find another intermediate form in the fossil record (you know, those things that the anti-evolutionists claim are missing links), it confirms the theory of evolution. If we ever found a fossil that could not be related to an earlier fossil, that would be the nail in evolution's coffin.

Similarly for cosmology. We perform some astronomical measurements, form a hypothesis, and from this we make predictions. Then we do new measurements, and see if they're consistent with the predictions. And someone else does some other measurements and cross-checks us. That's repetition.

[luke warm]

Winstonm, on 2011-February-09, 17:17, said:

Luther? Martin Luther? This Martin Luther?

Hmmmm. Curious judgement values to rely upon for theological decisions.

yeah, he was a tad extreme... but there are a lot of people who hold reprehensible personal ideologies whose scholarship is otherwise authoritative (to some degree)